Chinese Nationalism: The Temporary Fix That Became Permanent
Beeson (2014) writes that the 1911 Revolution marked the transition from imperial civilization to the nation-state, thus establishing nationalism as the predominant political force in China. While this development was perhaps necessary in order for China to remain relevant on the international stage in 1911, one must wonder if the adoption of nationalism in China was truly for its long-term betterment.
Put another way, was the transition to a nation-state simply a stopgap measure to counter pressures from without, notably European nation-states, that the Chinese were not truly ready to embrace and ultimately led to chaos in China throughout the 20th Century?
Cohen (2000) writes that the mid-nineteenth century was a “watershed in the history of international relations,” particularly regarding China’s longstanding dominance in the region being suddenly and irrevocably dismantled by European nation-states with superior technology, finances, perhaps even advanced spiritual enlightenment.
Cohen traces this transition to inept and arrogant actions on the part of British envoys to China as primary causes of the Opium War (1839-42), which caused deep resentment and acrimony between both Britain and China. This essentially prompted Britain to use its military to force China into engaging in a lucrative (for the British) opium trade via the Treaty of Nanjing, and led to the “hundred years humiliation” for China.
China, for millennia the preeminent civilization of Asia, was now exposed as an actor of little consequence on the world stage. Western nation-states had far superior technology, militaries, and economies; along with millions of citizens in Europe which lusted after Chinese goods – and drugs. Even the dreaded Japanese were trying to take a slice of the Chinese watermelon (Beeson, p. 30)!
Something had to be done, and fast. Attempts at reform by the Qing Dynasty in the early twentieth century modernized aspects of the bureaucracy, military and education to some extent. It was a substantial and perhaps well-meaning effort, but it was too little, too late. The reforms did not strike at the root of the issue, that being constant encroachment and repeated humiliating defeats at the hands of foreign powers with more money and better weapons. You don’t have a legitimate government if diplomats and entrepreneurs from another nation can just waltz in at will and have its way in your own homeland.
The very framework of international relations had shifted: China could no longer operate as an imperial civilization outside the European system of nation-states. Faced with this reality, nationalism became less a choice than a necessity. European-style nationalism was the only political language through which China could assert some form of international legitimacy and stave off further humiliation.
China simply was not ready, economically, militarily, even spiritually, to embrace this new political reality they had adopted, both suddenly and out of necessity for sheer survival. The absence of an imperial dynasty, which had been the governing force in China for millennia, left a power vacuum which was sought to be filled by two primary rivals: the Koumingtang and the Chinese Communist Party. Beeson writes that the CCP ultimately prevailed due to several factors, notably chronic disorganization within the KMT, the ability of the CCP to mobilize the peasantry, and notably American indifference toward who would ultimately prevail (p. 33).
The transition was not pleasant for the Chinese. Whereas Japan openly embraced Western-style nationalism (after enduring its own humiliation post World War II), China showed deep suspicion, even contempt toward commerce and trade with Western nations. Japan appears to have been eager to learn how the Americans could improve their existence, materially and even spiritually. The Chinese on the other hand feared that such an embrace of Western ideals would lead to a “dismemberment of the old institutional order.” However, Japan proved it could both embrace modern Western political and economic ideals and retain core cultural values inherited from antiquity. The result of this dichotomy was Western nations and businesses naturally wanted to do business with the Japanese, while China remained a significant albeit enigmatic entity. Japan thrived, while China struggled to establish its identity in this new international political order.
Tuong Vu argues that nationalism in post World War II Asia was hardly an organic outgrowth of indigenous civilizational traditions, but was instead molded primarily by a power grab among the victorious Allied powers. European-style nationalism coalesced organically over the course of several centuries in Europe. These Asian nations were expected to adopt it immediately, and oftentimes at the point of a gun. The results of these actions were predictably chaotic. Arbitrary boundaries, notably at the 38th parallel in Korea, hardened competing nationalisms among both North and South Koreans, illustrating that these new national identities were less chosen than forced by the geopolitical imperatives of Western superpowers.
As with Korea, nationalism in China was necessitated more by pressures from abroad: first by Western imperial powers in the nineteenth century, and later by Cold War alignments that demanded ideological clarity and national cohesion. In both cases, nationalism served as a stopgap measure to maintain legitimacy within an international system designed elsewhere, and not with the wellbeing of the Asian nations in mind.
There is hope that China is beginning to reconcile its civilizational antiquity with modern political realities. The revival of Confucian ethics, the Belt and Road Initiative, and other developments such as the “China Dream” rhetoric introduced by Xi Jinping in 2013 suggests efforts are being made to adopt modern nationalism with deeper civilizational pride, and perhaps even put the sad history which necessitated its hasty adoption of nationalism in the past forever. It is a long road however, and substantial hurdles in the form of territorial disputes and lingering nationalist fervor remain to be overcome.
In conclusion, I argue nationalism was not a natural outgrowth of Chinese civilization, but a forced adaptation to survive in an international order structured by European nation-states. Nationalism has been the thread binding China’s turbulent modern history, providing unity in the face of external threats and legitimacy for successive regimes. But it did not come without a high cost. The hastiness in which it was adopted produced one of the most oppressive regimes in the history of humanity, the abandonment of thousands of years of its shared history and values, and it remains an unpredictable force in the global political order.